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The mental models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2012; Khemlani, 
Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 2014; Khemlani, Lotstein, Trafton, & Johnson-
Laird, 2015; Oakhill &Garnham, 1996; Orenes& Johnson-Laird, 2012) is a current 
cognitive theory that proposes that human reasoning is not based on syntactic 
inferences from logical forms. According to it, people make iconic models or 
mental representations that are essentially semantic and refer to all of the 
possibilities that can be true given a proposition. In this way, the theory 
acknowledges that its fundamentals come from Peirce (1931-1958). However, an 
important point of the theory to this paper is that individuals do not always identify 
all of the models related to propositions. Some of the models are easy to be found 
and people usually note them quickly. Nevertheless, other models are harder to be 
identified without certain reflection or effort. This fact explains, for example, why 
individuals make certain mistakes and why certain inferences are more difficult 
than others. 
 
As far as I know, the theory is very developed with respect to what is called 
‘propositional inferences’ in standard logic, i.e., inferences with not quantified 
sentences. Regarding quantified expressions, the development is less, but 
undoubtedly there are works in that way. One of them is that of Khemlani et al. 
(2015), in which the models easy to be noted are named ‘canonical models’ and the 
harder models requiring more reflection are called ‘noncanonical models’. Thus, 
the main goal of this paper is to show that all of the valid categorical syllogisms in 
Aristotelian logic can be considered to be correct only taking the canonical models 
proposed by Khemlani et al. (2015) into account. This fact is relevant because, if 
the mental models theory is right, it means that the theory has clear predictions 
related to Aristotelian logic, and that it can be said that this logic should be 
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accepted by human beings in a natural and quick way. In other words, if we assume 
the general theses of the mental models theory, we must also assume, on the one 
hand, that the human mind can consider the syllogisms of Aristotelian logic to be 
valid without putting a lot of effort, and, on the other hand, that this logic can 
describe how human reasoning spontaneously works when faced with inferences 
with structures akin to those of such syllogisms. 
 
To prove all of this, firstly, I will account for the main ideas of the mental models 
theory about quantified assertions. Then I will explain the fundamental principles 
of Aristotelian logic. Finally, I will analyze each of the moods of each of the 
figures in that logic in order to show that they can be accepted as valid by 
considering only the canonical models. 
 
 
The mental models theory and quantified sentences 
 
As said, Khemlani et al. (2015) distinguish the canonical models (i.e., the models 
easily noted) from the noncanonical models (i.e., the models requiring certain 
cognitive effort). Their thesis is that, given a quantified expression, individuals 
think about some semantic possibilities corresponding to that expression. 
Obviously, such possibilities are models and represent particular situations. A 
problem is that it can be thought that the number of the models that can be 
considered by an individual at the same time is limited, since his (or her) working 
memory and mental abilities are not infinite. Khemlani et al. (2015) expose the 
procedures that can help identify the appropriate number of models in each case. 
Nevertheless, to the aims of this paper, it is enough to assume, as convention, the 
numbers that appear on Khemlani et al.’s (2015) table 1, that is, three models in the 
case of the canonical models, and three, four, or five models in the case of the 
noncanonical models. That table includes six types of assertions, but only four of 
them, those used in Aristotelian logic, are relevant to this paper: affirmative 
universal assertions, affirmative particular assertions, negative universal assertions, 
and negative particular assertions. I start with the affirmative universal ones. 
 
An affirmative universal expression is usually said to have this structure: 
 
Every x is y 
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According to the mental models theory, given such an expression, individuals can 
quickly think that these three canonical models represent all of the possible 
situations to which it refers: 
 
x   y 
x   y 
x   y 
 
Note that the three models stand for the same circumstance: a scenario in which 
both x and y are true. Thus, in principle, the affirmative universal propositions only 
cause individuals to consider scenarios in which the two terms of the expression 
are true. Only after further reflection, they can realize that other situations are 
possible. In this way, an example of noncanonical models corresponding to the 
affirmative universal assertions can be, following Khemlani et al. (2015), this one: 
 
x   y 
not-x   y 
not-x   not-y 
 
The first model is just as the previous ones. However, the other two models show 
that the individual is now aware that the assertion is also consistent with a situation 
in which something is not x but it is y, and with a situation in which something is 
neither x nor y. 
 
Maybe an example with thematic content can be illustrative in this regard. Let us 
think about this assertion: 
 
Every frog is green 
 
The canonical models refer to three different frogs and indicate that they are all 
green: 
 
frog   green 
frog   green 
frog   green 
 
Nonetheless, if the individual puts more effort, he (or she) can note that the 
assertion allows other possibilities too: 
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frog   green 
not-frog  green 
not-frog  not-green 
 
Indeed, the second model shows that something, for example, another animal, can 
be green and not a frog, and the third one refers to the possibility that something is 
not a frog and is not green at the same time. 
 
As far as the affirmative particular assertions are concerned, it can be stated that 
they are those that usually have this structure: 
 
Some x is y 
 
According to Khemlani et al. (2015), the canonical models are in this case: 
 
x   y 
x   y 
x   not-y 
 
Because all of the x are not y now, the third model expresses the possibility that 
something being x and not y. But the example of noncanonical models proposed by 
Khemlani et al. (2015) includes one more possibility: 
 
x   y 
x   not-y 
not-x   y 
 
As it can be checked, in this example, the individual has noted that at least there is 
another additional possibility: the case in which something is not x but it is y (the 
third model). 
 
Based on this, it is not hard to deduce the examples of models (both canonical and 
noncanonical) attributed by the negative assertions by Khemlani et al. (2015). Let 
us consider an expression such as this one: 
 
No x is y 
 
That is the structure corresponding to the negative universal assertions and, 
following Khemlani et al. (2015), its canonical models are as follows: 
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x   not-y 
x   not-y 
not-x   y 
 
But, of course, noncanonical models are also possible for this kind of assertion. 
According to them, an example can be this one: 
 
x   not-y 
x   not-y 
not-x   y 
not-x   not-y 
 
Finally, the negative particular assertions are said to have this structure: 
 
Some x is not y 
 
And Khemlani et al. (2015) indicate that the canonical models of an expression of 
this type can be: 
 
x   not-y 
x   not-y 
not-x   y 
 
And they also present, as an example of its noncanonical models, the following: 
 
x   not-y 
x   not-y 
not-x   y 
not-x   y 
 
These are the kinds of quantified assertions that are used in Aristotelian logic. As 
said, my main aim is to show that all of the valid categorical syllogisms in that 
logic can be considered to be correct by taking into account just the canonical 
models. However, before arguing in favor of this idea, it seems to be opportune to 
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Aristotelian logic and its valid categorical syllogisms 
 
As it is well known, medieval authors used letters for referring to the types of 
sentences analyzed in the previous section. Based on the Latin words afirmo (I 
state) and nego (I deny), they assumed these equivalences: 
 
-A (the first vowel in afirmo): affirmative universal assertions. 
-I (the second vowel in afirmo): affirmative particular assertions. 
-E (the first vowel in nego): negative universal assertions. 
-O (the second vowel in nego): negative particular assertions. 
 
There is no doubt that detailed information on and descriptions of Aristotelian logic 
are to be found in several good works. Only some of them are clearly, for example, 
Boger (1998, 2001, 2004), Burnett (2004), Gasser (1991), Johnson (2004), Miller 
(1938), Parsons (2008), Smith (1991), or Woods and Irvine (2004), but my 
arguments in this section will be based mainly (although not exclusively) on that of 
Parsons (2008). Having said that, a first important point about Aristotelian logic is 
that, as it is also well known, the syllogisms consist of three sentences: two 
premises and a conclusion. In addition, three elements can be distinguished in the 
syllogisms: the major term, the middle term, and the minor term. The major term 
appears in one of the premises and is the subject of the conclusion (from now on, I 
will refer to this term with the letter ‘s’). The middle term appears in the two 
premises, but it does not in the conclusion (from now on, I will refer to this term 
with the letter ‘m’). And the minor term appears in one of the premises and is the 
predicate of the conclusion (from now on, I will refer to this term with the letter 
‘p’). In this way, depending on the places in which s, m, and p are, several figures 
are possible. According to the classification exposed by Parsons (2008), the forms 
of such figures are these ones: 
 
-Figure 1 (explained by Aristotle in AnalyticaPriora I, 4): 
 
m is p 
s is m 
------------- 
Ergo s is p 
 
-Figure 1 (indirect) (explained by Aristotle in AnalyticaPriora I, 7): 
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m is s 
p is m 
------------- 
Ergo s is p 
 
-Figure 2 (explained by Aristotle in AnalyticaPriora I, 5):  
 
p is m 
s is m 
------------- 
Ergo s is p 
 
-Figure 3 (explained by Aristotle in AnalyticaPriora I, 6): 
 
m is p 
m is s 
------------- 
Ergo s is p 
 
From these figures, Aristotle proposed 19 moods by combining the assertions of 
the types A, I, E, and O indicated above. Thus, for example, a mood of the first 
figure can be expressed as follows: 
 
A(m · p) 
A(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo A(s · p) 
 
Where the initial capital letter stands for the kind of quantified assertion (in this 
case, ‘A’ informs that the assertion is affirmative universal) and ‘·‘ means ‘is’. 
 
Actually, as Parsons (2008) mentions referring to Arnauldand Nicole’s (1662) 
arguments, there are five more moods. However, I will only focus on those 
indicated by Aristotle. Such 19 moods were given names in the Middle Age. In 
particular, Peter of Spain, in his Tractatus (or Summulaelogicales) presented a 
number of names that could be learned in a relatively easy way and that provided 
data about the moods. Those names are the following: 
 
Figure 1: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio. 
Figure 1 (indirect): Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, and Frisesomorum. 
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Figure 2: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, and Barocho. 
Figure 3: Darapti, Felapto, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, and Ferison. 
 
Nevertheless, what is interesting for the goals of this paper is that the names show 
the forms of the moods. The first three vowels of each mood correspond to the 
types of quantified assertions included in it. Thus, the first vowel indicates the type 
of quantified assertion corresponding to the first premise, the second one indicates 
the type of quantified assertion corresponding to the second premise, and the third 
one indicates the type of quantified assertion corresponding to the conclusion. In 
this way, for example, the structure of Celarent is this one: 
 
E(m · p) 
A(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo E(s · p) 
 
These are the basic notions of Aristotelian logic that are relevant and that need to 
be taken into account to achieve the aims of this paper. As said, I have based my 
description on the version of it proposed by Parsons (2008) and I will continue to 
do that in the following pages. As also mentioned, my main goal is to show that 
just the canonical models presented by Khemlani et al (2015) enable to consider 
the valid categorical syllogisms (i.e., Aristotle’s 19 moods) to be correct without 
the need to make a further effort. I will try to do that in the next sections, each of 
which is devoted to a figure. 
 
The figure 1 and the canonical models 
 
The first mood of this figure is Barbara. Really, its form has already been 
presented above. It is this one: 
 
A(m · p) 
A(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo A(s · p) 
 
According to the framework based on the mental models theory proposed by 
Khemlani et al. (2015), the canonical models of the first premise are: 
 
m   p 
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m   p 
m   p 
 
But, given that the second premise states that s is not possible without m, the 
previous scenarios can be completed in this way: 
 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
 
Thus, these three models include the information provided by the two premises 
(that whenever m is true, p is true too, and whenever s is true, m is true as well), 
and, according to the canonical models, no more information can be considered. 
Therefore, what needs to be checked now is whether or not the information given 
in the conclusion is consistent with the previous three scenarios. It is easy to do that 
because what the conclusion means is that it is not possible a scenario with s and 
without p, and, as it can be observed in the previous models, there is no such a 
scenario. In all of them, if s happens, p is also present. 
 
The structure of Celarent has been indicated too. It is as follows: 
 
E(m · p) 
A(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo E(s · p) 
 
Now, the models of the first premise are: 
 
m   not-p 
m   not-p 
not-m   p 
 
And the information of the second one is that it is not possible s without m. So, in 
this case, it is allowed adding s to the models in which not-m is not: 
 
m   not-p   s 
m   not-p   s 
not-m   p 
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In this way, the conclusion is also correct in this case because it states that no s is p 
and, in the previous models, any scenario in which both s and p are true cannot be 
found. 
 
On the other hand, the structure of Darii is: 
 
A(m · p) 
I(s ·m) 
------------------ 
Ergo I(s · p) 
 
The canonical models of the first premise are now: 
 
m   p 
m   p 
m   p 
 
Nevertheless, if the information contained in the second one is taken into account, 
because it indicates that there can be a case in which s happens and m does not, it is 
necessary to add a new model: 
 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
not-m      s 
 
But this does not make the conclusion incorrect because it only states that there are 
cases of s and p and, as it can be checked, there are such cases. 
 
Finally, the form of Ferio is: 
 
E(m · p) 
I(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
The first assertion leads to these possibilities: 
 
m   not-p 
m   not-p 
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not-m   p 
 
But, because the canonical models of I indicate two situations in which both terms 
occur and one situation in which the first term appears and the second one does not, 
it is only necessary now to add a ‘s’ to each model: 
 
m   not-p   s 
m   not-p   s 
not-m   p   s 
 
And the conclusion is correct again, since it only states that there are cases of s and 
not-p, and we have two of those cases. 
 
The figure 1 (indirect) and the canonical models 
 
The structure of Baraliptonis obviously as follows: 
 
A(m · s) 
A(p · m) 
--------------- 
Ergo I(s · p) 
 
Thus, the canonical models of the first premise are: 
 
m   s 
m   s 
m   s 
 
Because the second one is also a sentence of type A, it is only necessary to add p to 
each scenario: 
 
m   s   p 
m   s   p 
m   s   p 
 
Therefore, the conclusion is consistent with these models. It claims that there are 
cases of s and p, and the models show that that is so in all the possibilities. 
 
A second mood of this figure is Celantes: 
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E(m · s) 
A(p · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo E(s · p) 
 
In this way, the models of the first assertion are as follows: 
 
m   not-s 
m   not-s 
not-m   s 
 
On the other hand, the second premise provides the information that p is not 
possible without m. So, p only can be added in the scenarios in which m is true: 
 
m   not-s   p 
m   not-s   p 
not-m   s 
 
And, because the conclusion says that s is impossible with p, and, in the only 
scenario in which s is, p is not, the conclusion is valid here as well.  
 
Another mood is Dabitis, and its form is, evidently, the following: 
 
A(m · s) 
I(p · m) 
--------------- 
Ergo I(s · p) 
 
The canonical models of the first assertion are: 
 
m   s 
m   s 
m   s 
 
And, given that the second one is affirmative particular, it is necessary to include a 
case of p without m: 
 
m   s   p 
m   s   p 
m   s   p 
not-m      p 
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And, since p appears in all of the cases in which s also appears, there is no doubt 
that the conclusion is correct here too. 
 
The following is Fapesmo, which has this structure: 
 
A(m · s) 
E(p · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
The canonical models of the first premise continue to be the same: 
 
m   s 
m   s 
m   s 
 
But the second one states that no p is m. Therefore, because in these three models 
m appears, it is necessary to add not-p to them. However, in addition, it is also 
necessary to include cases of p and not-m. Thus, the result is: 
 
m   s   not-p 
m   s   not-p 
m   s   not-p 
not-m      p 
not-m      p 
 
Nevertheless, the conclusion only requires s and p not to be together, which occurs 
in all of the possibilities. 
 
The last mood is here Frisesomorum, and its name, as in all of the other cases, 
reveals its form: 
 
I(m · s) 
E(p · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
The canonical models corresponding to the first sentence are, of course: 
 
m   s 
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m   s 
m   not-s 
 
Nonetheless, the second one is of type E, which means that in all of the models 
with m only not-p is possible, and that the cases of not-m must be added: 
 
m   s   not-p 
m   s   not-p 
m   not-s   not-p 
not-m      p 
not-m      p 
 
The conclusion only claims that there are cases of s and not-p, and as it can be 
checked, that is what happens in the two first models. Therefore, this mood is 
coherent with the canonical models proposed by Khemlani et al. (2015) as well. 
 
The figure 2 and the canonical models 
 
As indicated, the first mood of this figure is Cesare. So its form is the following: 
 
E(p · m) 
A(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo E(s · p) 
 
Thus, the canonical models of the first premise are these ones: 
 
p   not-m 
p   not-m 
not-p   m 
 
However, the second premise informs that s is only possible when m happens too. s 
hence can be added only in the third model: 
 
p   not-m 
p   not-m 
not-p   m   s 
 
And these scenarios allow checking that, indeed, as the conclusion says, there are 
not cases of s and p. 
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The second mood is Camestres. So its structure is this one: 
 
A(p · m) 
E(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo E(s · p) 
 
Therefore, the first sentence has the canonical models corresponding to the 
affirmative universal assertions, i.e., 
 
p   m 
p   m 
p   m 
 
But, given that the second one is a negative universal assertion, it is necessary to 
add certain data. Firstly, models in which s is true and m is false must be included. 
Secondly, it is also required to indicate that, when m happens, it is only possible 
not-s. In this way, the result is as follows: 
 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
   not-m   s 
   not-m   s 
 
Nevertheless, the two last models can be completed. The first premise informs that, 
if p occurs, m has to occur too. So, this update of the models is correct: 
 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
not-p   not-m   s 
not-p   not-m   s 
 
The final result hence is that, as stated by the conclusion, in the situations in which 
s happens, it cannot be accepted that p happens at the same time. 
 
Another mood of this figure is Festino, and this name leads us to this form: 
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E(p · m) 
I(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
If we think about the canonical models of the first premise, we can say that they are 
these ones: 
 
p   not-m 
p   not-m 
not-p   m 
 
The second one states that some s is m. Therefore, it allows two possibilities: i) 
both s and m are true, and ii) s is true and m is false. Thus, a way of updating the 
previous models is to add s to all of them, whether m is in them or not: 
 
p   not-m   s 
p   not-m   s 
not-p   m   s 
 
And, as it can be noted, this makes the conclusion true, since it shows that, indeed, 
there is at least a case of s and not-p (the last model). 
 
The final mood of the second figure is Barocho, and its structure is: 
 
A(p · m) 
O(s · m) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
Obviously, as in the case of Camestres, the first sentence leads us to these 
canonical models: 
 
p   m 
p   m 
p   m 
 
But the second one is a negative particular assertion, which means, on the one hand, 
that it is necessary to add cases of not-m (in which s is true), and, on the other hand, 
to include not-s in the cases in which m happens: 
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p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
   not-m   s 
   not-m   s 
 
Nevertheless, for reasons akin to those indicated for Camestres (p is only possible 
if m is true), the last two models can be updated here as well: 
 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
p   m   not-s 
not-p   not-m   s 
not-p   not-m   s 
 
And the result is that the conclusion of this mood is clearly valid because there are 
cases in which s happens and p does not (the last two models). 
 
The figure 3 and the canonical models 
 
As indicated, this is the last figure that I will analyze in this paper, and its first 
mood is Darapti. As in the previous cases, the name reveals its structure: 
 
A(m · p) 
A(m · s) 
--------------- 
Ergo I(s · p) 
 
And this structure implies that the canonical models of the first assertion are the 
following: 
 
m   p 
m   p 
m   p 
 
The second sentence, on the other hand, indicates that s has to be included in all of 
these models, since m appears in all of them: 
 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
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m   p   s 
 
So, the conclusion is true because some s are p (in fact, all of them are). 
 
The next mood is Felapto, i.e., a mood with this form: 
 
E(m · p) 
A(m · s) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
The first models are therefore as follows: 
 
m   not-p 
m   not-p 
not-m   p 
 
Nonetheless, the second premise claims that cases of m without s are not possible 
and that these models hence describe better the possible scenarios: 
 
m   not-p   s 
m   not-p   s 
not-m   p 
 
Evidently, the fact that m does not happen in the third model can lead us to add 
not-s in it. However, it is obvious that the two first models show that the 
conclusion is true: there are cases in which s occurs and p does not. 
 
Another mood corresponding to this figure is Disamis, whose structure is clearly: 
 
I(m · p) 
A(m · s) 
--------------- 
Ergo I(s · p) 
 
So, the canonical models of the first premise are now: 
 
m   p 
m   p 
m   not-p 
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And the second premise causes s to be included in all of the models, since m is true 
in all of them: 
 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
m   not-p   s 
 
Thus, these possibilities show that the conclusion is correct, since there are cases of 
s and p (the first one and the second one). 
 
The fourth mood of the third figure is Datisi, and its form hence is: 
 
A(m · p) 
I(m · s) 
--------------- 
Ergo I(s · p) 
 
This means that the first sentence refers to these canonical models: 
 
m   p 
m   p 
m   p 
 
And, because m appears in the three cases, the models of the second premise can 
be considered by including s in the two first possibilities and not-s in the last one: 
 
m   p   s 
m   p   s 
m   p   not-s 
 
In this way, its conclusion is also absolutely correct. The reason is the two first 
models, which show that some s are p. 
 
Bocardo is also a model of this figure. As its name reveals, its structure is: 
 
O(m · p) 
A(m · s) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
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The negative particular assertion that appears in the first premise leads us to these 
models: 
 
m   not-p 
m   not-p 
not-m   p 
 
And the affirmative universal assertion that appears in the second one leads us to 
add s in all the cases in which m is true: 
 
m   not-p   s 
m   not-p   s 
not-m   p 
 
So, it can be noted that there are cases of s and not-p (the two first possibilities), 
and that that fact means that the conclusion is correct. 
 
Finally, the last model is Ferison, which has this form: 
 
E(m · p) 
I(m · s) 
---------------- 
Ergo O(s · p) 
 
The canonical models of its first premise are: 
 
m   not-p 
m   not-p 
not-m   p 
 
Thus, the models of its second premise can be taken into account by including s in 
the scenarios in which m happens, and by adding another scenario in which m is 
true and s is not: 
 
m   not-p   s 
m   not-p   s 
not-m   p 
m      not-s 
 
Again, the two first premises show that the conclusion is true, since they reveal that, 
indeed, some s are not p. In this way, it can be said that all of the moods analyzed 
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in this paper can be accepted following the mental models theory, and, in particular, 




The precedent pages provide important consequences for the study of the human 
mind if the mental models theory is assumed. Given that the conclusions of all of 
the reviewed moods can be drawn by using just the canonical models indicated by 
Khemlani et al. (2015), it can be stated that Aristotelian logic presents a set of 
inference schemata that are natural for human reasoning. By this, I mean that, 
because the valid categorical syllogisms of that logic can be considered to be 
correct by taking only the canonical models into account, according to the mental 
models theory, human beings should accept such syllogisms in a quick way and 
without making further cognitive effort. Thus, it can also be stated that those 
syllogisms can be very useful for explaining, describing, and even predicting the 
results of the reasoning tasks in which they are involved. 
 
This point is relevant because, as it is well known, the same cannot be said about 
standard logic and the natural deduction calculi (see, e.g., Gentzen, 1935). Indeed, 
the literature on cognitive science shows that there are several situations in which 
simple principles, rules, or requirements of standard logic are not followed or 
fulfilled by people (see, e.g., Orenes& Johnson-Laird, 2012). Apart from that, 
another problem of that logic is that, when it addresses quantified assertions (for 
example, when first-order predicate calculus is used), it resorts to very complex 
formulae, and it is unclear which the mental process why individuals make or 
construct those formulae could be (see, e.g., López-Astorga, 2014). 
 
But the mental models theory seems not to have these problems. In almost all of 
the books, chapters, and papers related to it, one might check that this theory can 
account for and predict many of the results offered by participants in reasoning 
tasks that standard logic or theories more or less based on that logic cannot explain. 
Furthermore, given that logical form is not relevant for the mental models theory, 
which is essentially a semantic approach (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2010), the 
problem of the translation of individuals’ mental representations into ‘well formed 
formulae’ does not exist in that framework. 
 
26 Miguel López-Astorga 
 
But the most important finding of this paper can be that the mental models theory 
can prove that it is worth continuing to consider Aristotelian logic. If the precedent 
arguments are right, it is obvious that Aristotelian logic is not obsolete, that it has 
cognitive value, and that it can be very useful to describe and make predictions 
about human inferential activity. In this way, it could be very interesting that the 
proponents of the theory checked empirically and experimentally arguments such 
as those proposed here, and that they designed experiments using Aristotelian valid 
syllogisms in order to review whether or not my analysis in this paper and, of 
course, their theses on quantified assertions are correct. And I am saying this 
because, at least as far as I know, such a work is not made at present. In any case, a 
point seems to be absolutely clear: the use of the main theses and the methodology 
of the mental models theory can be very helpful in checking whether or not the 
logical theories of the past continue to be somehow applicable tools today. 
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In the case of quantified propositions, the mental models theory distinguishes between 
canonical and noncanonical models. While people identify the canonical models in an 
immediate, rapid, and easy way, the noncanonical models cannot be detected without 
reflection and cognitive effort. In this paper, I try to show that all of the valid syllogisms in 
Aristotelian logic can be considered to be correct by resorting only to the canonical models 
of their sentences. In this way, I argue that this means that Aristotelian logic can be a useful 
criterion to explain, describe, and even predict people’s conclusions from quantified 
assertions. 
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